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I. Introductlon 
W hen Illinois employees are the . victims of intentional torts by 
supervisors,' can they bring common 
law tort suits against their employers 
for these injuries, or are they limited to 
bringing a claim under the workers' 
compensation system? This question, 
which arises with unfortunate reguIari· 
ty, lacks a clear answer because both 
state and federal courts in Illinois are 
divided over the scope of the "alter 
ego" exception to the exclusivity of 
workers' comperuation as the remedy 
for intentionally inflicted workplace 
injuries. 
The Illinois Workers' Compensation 
Act ('1WCA") contains exclusivity pr0-
visions that mandate that workers' 
compensation is the sole remedy avail-
able to employees for workplace 
injuries.2 There are exceptions to the 
exclusivity rule, including the principle 
that the rule does not apply if the injury 
is not accidental.3 
In Meerbrey v ~rshall Field and Co., 
Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court held 
tha~ employees were barred from suing 
then employers in tort for injuries 
intentionally inflicted by co-workers 
because such injuries were "accidental" 
for purposes of the IWCA.4 The court 
explained that "such injuries are unex-
pected and unforeseeable from the 
injured employee's point of view." 
More importantly, these injuries "are 
also accidental from the employer's 
point of view" and therefore lithe 
employer has a to consider that 
the injured s sole remedy 
against the wtllbeu.nder the 
workers' statute. "$ 
empto),-
ltCtiOft5 
against their co-workers for intentb'-IJJ 
torts. The court found that such suits 
are not barred by the exclusivity rule 
because persons who committed inten-
tional torts should not be permitted to 
claim that their victims' injuries were 
accidental and covered by the IWCA.' 
The Meerbrey court used a similar 
rationale in reaffinning two judidl!llly 
created exceptions to the IWCA's 
preclusion of employee suits against 
employers for intentionally inflicted 
injuries. Citing prior Illinois courtcled,.. 
sions, the court held that the exclusivity 
rule would not apply where (l) the 
injuries were intentionally inflicted. by 
"the employer or its alter ego," or (2) 
the injuries "were commanded or ex-
pressly authorized by the employer."' 
The court reasoned that "the employer 
"Professor Hayes thanks Professor Patrick JCeIkoy 
for his valuable comments on an eerller dolt and 
law student Kamran Q. Khan for his excellent 
research _istsnce. 
1. In this article, the term "supervi8or" will refer 
generically to ~II persons with supervisory or _-
agerial authority over employees, regardless of 
their level of authority. 
2. See 820 ILCS 305/5(a) ("No common IiIw or 
statutory right to recover damages h'om the 
employer ... or the [employer'sl agents oremptoy_· 
ees ... for Injury or death sustained by M'lY ~'IIt! 
while engaged in the line of his duty.lI .. cll 
employee, other than the compt!NIIH:on ~.po­
vided. is available to any employee who.1s~ 
by the provisions of this Act"); 8H~t.'GS 
305/1l("The rompensatlon.heretII ~."iM 
be the measure of the I'I!IIpOIWtbtlityOfId\Y~ 
er ... for acddentallnjurles sustained by M\y.~... . -.. 
ee"). 
3. See Collifr!l Nrg!m ~ Co... . 
408 NE2d 198,202 (1980). 
4. 1391l12d 455, !1M Nat 1 •• 1_,<' •. 
Il'Qifp!B'Il1litald to a8lel'tthat 
~h'ac:ddentlll," and'. there-
Hdushre provisions of 
himself committed 
.... 'deCilk)J\ did not define 
these exceptions. 
eight years since 
employees 
itig_ted the meaning 
many cases of 
by supervisors, 
has contended 
l11aen1lor Is an "alter ego" of 
that the exclusivity 
nOlt'.Dltr a ,ult against the 
IlUnOlls court., however, 
leallt three different 
.'UFEIlIU alter ego exception, 
~<lliICW. below. 
~.ltIor .. of the "Alter Ego'" 
1I.:'a _1'11e employee daimed 
'llPetR)nhad harasled and 
mh)l'lrlOre than 18 months in 
·oo;.!d:km to allegedly 
;Dank pr'actlces. Based on this 
sued his 
~erfj[)f.:iJltenlti011al infliction of 
.deltlelS; One of the employ-
.. ..., ............ that the suit was 
the .. ·exclusi'vity provisions of 
ing any type of suJlervisor. These' deci-
sions have found the alter ego excep-
tion applicable to, for example, three 
"management employees" whose pow-
ers were not described in.the plaintiff's 
complaint,12eight supervisory and man-
agerial staffers of various rank,ll a 
worker "employed ... in a supervisory 
capacity,"'· a district manager,15 and a 
vice president of corporate relatioos.'· 
In Feliciano, Tolson, Wysong, and 
Whitehead, the courts found that for 
purposes of denying defendants' 
motions to dismiss, the "alter ego" sta-
tus of the alleged tortfeasors was suffi-
ciently demonstrated by allegations 
that they had such standard superviso-
ry powers as the authority to discharge 
employees, to mriew employee perfor-
mance, and to grant vacation and sick 
Ieaves.'7 
Only two of these decisions, both by 
Judge Norg1e of the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, 
offered any rationale for the conclusion 
tha t all supervisors are alter egos of 
their employer. In Whitehead, the court 
noted that the seminal decision, 
Tohnson, had not explained why the 
bank managers were alter egos. The 
court then provided its own explana-
tion: "[WJhere the employer is a ficti-
tious person, i.e., corporate entity, and 
its authorities and powers are necessar-
ily delegated to supervisors to conduct 
the corporate business, the supervisors 
act as alter egos of the corporate 
entity."'· 
Similarly, in Feliciano, the court rea-
soned that where the empioyer is a "fic-
titious person," like a corporation, 
"powers are necessarily delegated to 
managers to conduct the corporate 
business" and so those managers may 
be alter egos of the corporation. I. 
Under these precedents that broadly 
interpret the alter ego exception, an 
employee's showing that the person 
who committed the intentional tort 
possessed standard· sUp.i!rvisory pow-
ers is sufficient to overcome the exclu-
sivity ofthelWCAand to permit the 
employee to bring a common law 
action against his or her employer. 
B. ThI SM,*" I""~tfJti(J"': 
feasor has such a dominant role 
stantial ownership interest In the 
employer that there is a blurring of 
8. Id. 
9. 199111 App 3d 427, 557 NE2d 328 (1st 019110). 
10. Id, 557 NE2d at 329-30. 
11. Id, 557 NE2d at 332. 
12. Bullilillgh v Soulh ChkllgD C""'e. IIIC., 830 F 
Supp4l7. 442. 443 (NO 1111993). 
13. Felit'illllo v Itrry'~ Fruit Imll C",rlle" Cellttr, 
Inc., No 9J..C-591J, 1994 WL 142963, 1 (NO III April 
15,1994). 
14. 1bIIIOII v HHI. FillimclRl SmJim;, Inc., No. 94-
C·513("I995WL461883.1 (NOIIIAuR3,1995). 
15. Wys{lIIg v Wmlly's lillI, IIIC., 71 PEr CII_ 
(BNA) 1472 (NO 111 1996). 
16. Whittluwd t' AM '"",1160 F Supp 12110. 1285. 
1290 (NO 1111994). 
17. FclicillllO, 1994 WL 14296.1, al 3; 1111110", 1995 
WL 461883, at 3: WllSO"g, 71 FEr CiI_ II 1474: 
Whittluwd, 1160 P Supp at 1290. 
18. 860 F 5upp al 1290. 
19. 1994 WL 14296.1, al 3. 
20. 63 III App 3d 908, 3110 NE2d 924 (1,;1 0 
1978). 
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suits against 
<fQr;'inttmtic>nal torts by su-
IM'CD\I1n declared that the 
the rule which 
Under the~tion 01 alter ego 
adopted in TtlbIortski,most supervisors 
would not be covered by the alter ego 
exception. The .qUotations from Lanon 
repeatedly distinguiJh between "gen_ 
• Ctssrnan. .. offered 
a senslDleresolutlon 
to the conflict over 
the altar ego 
.x~.Underthe 
01Stm8n standard, 
an individual II 
deemed an alter ego 
If .... or ..... ·ha. 'the 
authorItY to make 
decision. and set 
policy on behalf of 
the empIoyer.' and 
thus 'speakS for 
the company.'· 
uine alter egos" and "mere supervi-
sor'S." Moreover, the reference, in the 
second passage from Larson, to the 
ordinary corporate law standards on 
alter ego suggests a particularly narrow 
definition of that roncept. In corporate 
law, the alter ego doctrine applies only 
when there is "such unity of interest or 
ownership that the individual and cor-
poration are, for all practical purposes, 
coextensive."lI6 Thus, under the stan-
dard set forth in the Larson treatise, 
and adopted in /tfbIomJki, the alter ego 
exception would apply only in unusual 
cim.unstances. 
Since the alter ego exception was 
reaffirmed by the Meerbrey decision in 
1990, several dedsions in DIinois have 
relied on./IrbIfmski·and the Lanon trea-
tisein stridIy:1imiting that exception. 
One striking examPle is Joyce v HHL 
Finncild sm,;m,'II in -which .the court 
found· that that· the tortfea.. 
~with 
promote, dis· 
between employee and COI'BOrate" 
employer that has been UlIlICICU 
a1ter-ego mncept.HIII 
Both Damato v Tack P""'n CIIerJmIet 
Ceo, Inc. and Al-Dabbtlgh v G~I 
Inc. relied on lengthyquotesftom 
Jablonski and the Larson treatise m. 
explaining why the alter ego exception 
did not apply.29In an unpublished ded-
sion in 1996, the seventh circuit also 
employed the JIIblonski standard in rul-
ing that the alter ego exception did not 
apply.:IOIn 1997, the seventh circuit 
again appeared to apply the strict inter-
pretation of alter ego when it held, 
without elaboration, that a "head 
supervisor" did not possess "sul&ient 
stature" to be the employer's alter ego.11 
Thus, in contrast to the Johnson line 
01 cases discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the decisions applying the 
Jablonski definition of alter ego have 
held that the alter ego exception to 
exclusivity applies only in very limited 
cim.unstances. 
C. A MiMk GtoIl,",: TIre Crissman 
Decision 
In Crissman v Healthco InttrnlltioMl, 
21. Arthur Larson .. Lex Larson, l.IIrlHlII 
WorkMtn's COMpenu/ion l.IIw (Matthew Bender 
1996). 
22. 380 NE2d at 926. 
23. kI,380 NE2d at 9'0 (quoting Arthur lAnon. 
2A 7lIt Urw of NIrkIIItn's Co/nptIIsIIlion Urw § 68.21) 
(emphasis added). 
24. 217 Ad< 350. 230 SW2d 28 (1950). 
25, 380 NE2d at 927 (quoting Arthur lA.-. 
2A NIrkIIItn's Co/nptIIsII/ion Urw § 68.22) (emphasis 
added). 
26. Fmdtlich v ,.R. Froelich Mfg. Co .• 93 In App 
3d 179,416 NE2d 1134. 1137 (1st D 1981). 
'rI. No 94-C-5357, 1995 WL 215169 (ND III 
April 10. 1995). 
28. 1995 WL 215169 at 3. 
29. 0. .... /0. 927 F Supp 283, 291-92 (ND HI 
1996); N-DIIIJNgII, 873 F Supp 1105. 1113-14 (NO • 
1994). In A'-~. the court ~ thiltdte 
tortt-w did not even have a ~or_ 
agement role, but stn!sMd in a foolRoIe ... tNs 
oIMervation Hshould not be IIIiIuftdentood as .... 
gestins that IddsJ type of low Ie'ft!I stl!t\lll __ __ 
ponte hleran:hy ... would IIIUftke to It'i:IIIP!r .... 
nIIIpOIISiblIity for the corponItion. H 8Y3 p 9IW itt 
111409. 
30. CHkfIin " """-Mart ~ hie., Nus ~ 
and 9S-ZS14, 1996 WL 12B.t (fth Or .. '" ... 
Uader the NIea of the IMM!Mh ~. lift •••. 
IIshed dedsioft ~~be'~ .~ .•.. 







iUit·.be··.virtuaJllv one and the 
Rovner 
interpretation 01 thel.ter ego exception 
was inapproprUate.becaWieacorpora-
tion couId<be.~tebom its·owners 
under theltrkt~tetegoSWldani "and 
yet take purpoflcmalactionswhich are 
injurious to theb'employees."fl 
P.Icking up orrProfeSsor Larson's WIe 
of the term l'rea1iatkally maIter ego," 
Judge Rovner propo$ed a "realistic and 
prlctical appraisaJ"of which persons 
should be deemed alter egos.42 Judge 
Rovner reasoned that "Isltatus as a 
'foreman, supervisor, or mlnager' 
alone" was not sufficient to make an 
individual an alter ego, if that individu-
allacked poJicymIking authority.43 But 
where In individual has "the authority 
to make decisionslnd set policy on 
behalf of an employer," then that indi-
vidual could reaJistiailly be regarded as 
the employer's alter ego. Accordingly, 
Judge Rovner found that "when the 
tortfeasor holds a position in which he, 
in a practical sense, speaks for the com-
pany, he may be. deemed the employ-
er's alter ego for purposes of the 
Workers' Compensation Act."" 
Judge Rovner then explained that, 
under this "realistic and practical" 
approach, more than one person may 
be deemed a company's alter ego. For 
example, Judge Rovner stated, "To the 
extent that each of Healthco's seven 
regional managers had final decision-
making authority with respect to the 
policies and procedures within his or 
her region ... eachmay qualify as an alter 
ego."45 Judge Rovner added that "Itlhe 
same might arguably be said at the 
level of branches and branch man-
agers .... " The key was whether the indi-
vidual had "authority" to deliver the 
employer's "final word" in his or her 
sphere .... If so, then that individual 
would qualify .slmalter ego. 
Judge Rovner found that another 
fador supporting application of the 
exc:epl:iOO inCrissmmr was that 
aUn:e!dltotlts involved recurrent 
33. Id al 73.000. 
34. Id al 72,999-73.000. 
35. Judge Rovner, who now aervllllllll a _enth 
cin:uit appellate justice, decided CrissmlllI when she 
wala federal district rourt judge. 





40. Id at 73.001. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id (quoting Arthur Lal'!lOn, 2A Workmert'S 




47. Id at 73.001-73,002. 
48. Id at 73,003. 
49. Id. 
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Alberts, and Reynolds, the 
01'1rCriR!~1ft;2t1 in consider-
.tolrUI!aSOr"s decisional 
n>t'1In'IPnt nature of 
~ •. injfinc:jling the plain-
... u .... '" alter ego 
The onltyr'atic)na)e 
offeredfot·.the 
that"cm'J'()rationtlnust act through 
their supervisors" -is .. untenable. 
Under that rationale, . the alter ego 
exception should not be limited to 
supervisors I.)ecauaeOOrporations dele-
gatefurictions to, and "ad through," all 
t:heIrempio)tees.By contrast, the ratio-
nale appanmtiyexcludes non-corporate 
entities, such as partnerships and pro-
prietorships,from the alter ego excep-
tion, even though the$e entities also 
delegate powers to supervisors and 
other employees. There i. no logical 
reason why the employer's form of 
organization should so greatly impact 
whether it can be sued in tort for the 
intentional acts of its employees. 
The strict interpretation of alter ego, 
however, is too narrow. As was dis-
cussed in Section II, the strict interpre-
tation derives from the Larson treatise 
on workers' 1:ompensation. But even 
the Larson tr~atise recognizes that 
exclusivity should not apply where the 
injury is inflicted by employer policy-
milkers. In the section following the sec-
tion on alter ego, the Larson treatise 
notes that the "unpremeditated 
assaults" by supervisors discussed in 
preceding sections "could not conceiv-
ably be said to have any content of cor-
porate or employer policy."S< Relying 
on this point in the Larson treatise, 
another commentator has asserted, 
"When ... an injury is intended and 
effectuated through a deliberate man-
agerial decision by those with corporate 
decision-milking responsibility and author-
ity rtgrlrdingsuch matters, a strong argu-
ment can be made for allowing a tort 
claim."S5 
In Crissman, Judge Rovner offered a 
sensible resolution' to the conflict over 
the al exception. Under the 
Crissman an individual is 




apply in cases 
itse1fcommitted the inlllI\tkNl.tOJjt. 
It is reasonable and fair 
Crissman standard does, I.l'N'''.''''''_ .• 
tort is committed byakey QiUiBi;. 
maker of an.empIoyer, it.istruJY 
mitted by the employer. Moreover; 
Judge Rovner emphasized, 
Crissman standard. is baaed.ona "_ ... 1 .. "'-, 
tic and practical appraisal" ofwhaflt 
means to be an alter ego of an employ-
er. 
For these reasons, the state and red-
eral courts of Illinois should uniformly 
adopt the Crissman standan:l for defin-
ing the alter ego exception to workers' 
compensation exclusivity. Then, the 
workers of Illinois would know with 
greater certainty whether they can go 
to court to Obtain relief for intentional 
torts in the workplace. .qz. 
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